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INTRODUCTION

Design patents, while traditionally overshadowed by their utility counterparts, have
recently attracted national, and international, attention. In 2013, the United States joined the
Hague Agreement, an international system that centralizes design patent applications. While it
has been successful in Europe, it is not clear whether the idiosyncratic U.S. patent system can
accommodate the predicted influx of applications. This paper reviews the U.S. and E.U. design
protection regimes and the impact of their accession to the Hague Agreement. Part I of this paper
introduces design patents and their significance in the scheme of intellectual property protection.
Part II compares the U.S. and E.U. design protection regimes. Finally, Part III explores how the
Hague Agreement has supported the harmonization of design protection in the E.U. and
questions whether it will encourage, or overwhelm, the U.S. regime.
I. DESIGNS AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In the field of patent law, the “utility” patent that covers technological innovations
dominates. The design patent, although infrequently sought, is derived from the same principles
and offers the same type of protection to ornamental designs. While a design may not be as
prototypically innovative, producers are recognizing the significant impact that a product’s
appearance has on its commercial success. The recent smartphone wars, which nearly awarded
$1 billion to Apple based on Samsung’s design infringement, 1 has also illustrated the benefits of
patenting designs in addition to the technology they decorate.

1

See Samsung Elec. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S.C. 429 (2016) (reconsidering the basis of the $1 billion
award but reiterating the legitimacy of design patents).
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A. Defining a Design
A patent is a type of intellectual property that covers any novel and nonobvious invention
“under the sun that is made by man.” 2 A patent grants something akin to a limited-term
monopoly, preventing anyone besides the patent owner from selling, using, or otherwise
“infringing” the covered invention. 3 The traditional rationale behind patent protection is that
scientists will not invest in technological research if inventors cannot profit from their
inventions. 4 A competitive market—a market in which anyone can produce the invention, not
just the inventor—will suppress prices to the marginal cost of producing the invention. Anyone
who copies and sells the invention, without having to first invest in researching the technology,
can therefore sell it in the market at the marginal cost of production. Consequently, the inventor
never has the opportunity to recoup the development costs. A patent, however, gives the inventor
the legal right to stop anyone else from using or selling the technology. The inventor can then set
the price at a profitable point. As a matter of policy, this should encourage inventors to invest in
research without worrying about others copying, and profiting from, their hard work.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) broadly classifies patents as
either utility patents or design patents. 5 The first “protects the way an [invention] is used and
works,” while the second “protects the way an [invention] looks.” 6 Consider two different
patents on forks. The first covers a novel combination of fork and spoon to create a spork that
requires only one utensil for two separate functions. 7 Because this is a functional article, the

2

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
35 USC § 271(a).
4
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1580 (2003).
5
The categories are directly drawn from the statutory framework. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Inventions
patentable) and 35 U.S.C. § 171 (Patents for designs).
6
USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1502.
7
See, e.g., David P. Eisner, Combined Fork and Spoon, U.S. Patent No. 398264A (Feb. 19, 1889).
3
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patent is a utility patent. The second covers the pattern engraved on the handle, like the “cottage
pattern” on the far left below. 8

This design is not at all useful in the sense that it affects the function of the utensil, but the
designer sought protection because it differentiated his utensils from other producers’, leading to
commercial success. 9
Inventors must apply for a design patent through the USPTO. According to the USPTO’s
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), the inventor must show that her design is: “(A)
a design for an ornament, impression, print, or picture applied to or embodied in an article of
manufacture (surface indicia); (B) a design for the shape or configuration of an article of
manufacture; [or] (C) a combination of the first two categories.” 10 Moreover, designs must be
new, non-obvious, original, and ornamental. 11 The agency undertakes an extensive substantive
review of applications and relevant prior art, which comprises all preexisting designs, to

8

See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 521 (1871) (showing the patented design on the far left and
the allegedly infringing designs next to it).
9
Id. at 512.
10
MPEP § 1504.01.
11
Lena Schickl, Protection of Industrial Design in the United States and in the EU: Different Concepts or
Different Labels?, 16 J. World. Intell. Prop. 15, 19 (2013).
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determine patent eligibility. 12 The review takes an average of twenty months. 13 If the agency
decides to grant the patent, it will be effective for fifteen years. 14 During that time, the patent
holder can enforce her patent against infringers who use or sell a sufficiently similar design.
Infringement, as classically articulated in Gorham Co. v. White, occurs when “in the eye of an
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are
substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to
purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.” 15
Patent owners can bring claims against alleged infringers in federal court and ask for either
damages or injunctive relief. 16
B. Why Design Patents Matter
The traditional “incentive” rationale for utility patents also informs the policy for design
patents, but imperfectly. 17 Yes, it takes resources to develop preferred aesthetics, and designs
once developed are easy for others to copy. There is, however, good reason to be skeptical about
whether patent protection is driving design innovation. 18 After all, many companies develop new
designs to keep up with consumers’ short attention spans. 19 The lifespan of a successful design
may not outlive the USPTO’s review of the application. If, then, patents are not encouraging

12

Tiffany Mahmood, Design Law in the United States As Compared to the European Community Design
System: What Do We Need to Fix?, 24 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 555, 577–79 (2014).
13
USPTO, Design Patents 2 (March 2015), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/design.pdf.
14
35 U.S.C. § 173.
15
Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
16
35 U.S.C. § 283 (permitting courts to enjoin infringing acts); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (permitting courts to
award damages to compensate for infringing acts).
17
See Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 277,
290 (2013).
18
Id. at 289–93 (reviewing critiques that design patents chill design and do not affect companies’ desire
to meet consumers’ capricious tastes); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American
Design Patent Protection, 88 Ind. L.J. 837, 841 (2013) (discussing disparities in the economic rationale
behind utility and design patents).
19
See Lee & Sunder, supra at 17, at 291.
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aesthetic innovation, there may not be a legitimate purpose for keeping them around. Moreover,
design patents—unlike utility patents—do not provide additional information to the public that is
not already visible from the design itself. 20
While there is reason to be skeptical of design patents, there is also good reason to
encourage design innovation and protect designers who seek ownership rights. Designs enrich
the marketplace, even though it may be hard to quantify their value. 21 A product’s appearance
can significantly impact its marketability, and pleasing designs definitively—and
unsurprisingly—contribute to commercial success. 22 In competitive marketplaces, in which a
variety of functional substitutes are available, consumers often make choices based on a product
designs. 23 Designs also communicate important ideas to consumers, including what the product
can do, how the product symbolizes cultural values, and what aesthetic qualities to expect from
that brand. 24
Traditionally, design patents have been overlooked by U.S. companies and IP scholars. 25
Congress, despite recently overhauling the general patent system, has also largely ignored
them. 26 As a result, courts have been reluctant to expand intellectual property protection over
new kinds of designs. Compare the popularity of utility patents with design patents: in 2015, the
USPTO received around 288,000 utility patent applications and granted 141,000, while it
received only 39,000 design patents and granted 26,000. 27 This is likely due in part to the

20

See Lee and Madhavi, supra at 17, at 293.
Susanna Monseau, The Challenge of Protecting Industrial Design in A Global Economy, 20 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 495, 501–02 (2012).
22
Id. at 502–03.
23
Schickl, supra at 11, 15.
24
Id. at 501–02.
25
Id. at 278 (calling design patents “a relatively understudied branch of intellectual property law”).
26
See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
27
USPTO, U.S. Patent Statistics, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
21
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relative ease of U.S. copyright and trademark protections, which sometimes overlap with design
patents in eligible subject matter. 28 Getting a design patent is a slow and expensive process, and
the rules governing eligibility are complex. 29 If there is an easier way to get protection, designers
may avoid the process.
There has, however, been a steady, but slow, growth in the number of U.S. designers
applying for patents. 30 Significant rewards for design patent infringement in cases like the
smartphone wars have brought the merits of design patents to general attention. 31 In addition,
technologies for which it is difficult to secure utility patents are being reviewed as candidates for
design patents. 32 Even the USPTO has recognized the potential for design patents and has been
marketing them to the public. 33
II. INTERNATIONAL DESIGN PATENT REGIMES
A. European System
European Union Community Designs
The European Union (E.U.) in 1998 began working to harmonize design patent standards
among the member states. 34 The rationale behind an E.U.-administered design system was to
stabilize trade in the E.U. and, primarily, to ensure that one Member State did not grant design
patents to functional inventions and thus distort competition among the states. 35 It established the

28

See MPEP § 1512.
Monseau, supra at 21, 539.
30
USPTO, Design Patents A1-1, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/design.pdf.
31
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Design Patent Evolution: From Obscurity to Center Stage, 32 Santa Clara
High Tech. L.J. 53, 54 (2016); Lee and Madhavi, supra at 17, at 278.
32
See, e.g., Michael Risch, Functionality and Graphical User Interface Design Patents, 17 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 53 (2013).
33
See, e.g., Colin B. Harris, Recap of USPTO’s Design Day 2016 (Apr. 26, 2016), available at
http://www.protectingdesigns.com/recap-of-uspto-s-design-day-2016.
34
Mahmood, supra at 12, 566–67.
35
Schickl, supra at 11, 23.
29
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Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM), now known as the European Union
Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), 36 to govern community designs. 37 Notably, they are
considered separate from patents, which are handled through the European Patent Office.
Through the Directive on the Legal Protection of Designs in 1998, the E.U. required that
Member States harmonize their national design laws. 38 The E.U. also, through the Community
Design Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002, protects E.U. community designs in each member state. 39
Whether a community design is registered or unregistered affects how long it is protected.
Registered designs can be protected for up to twenty-five years, while unregistered designs get
protection for only three years. 40
The EUIPO examines design applications for eligibility under only the CDR’s definition
of design and the E.U.’s morality standards. 41 This amounts to a purely procedural review that
barely considers the application’s substance. Because there is no substantive examination, the
EUIPO processes applications in an average of five days. 42 A registered community design
(RCD) grants the owner the exclusive right to use the design and prevent third parties from
using, selling, or otherwise commercially exploiting the design. 43 A RCD does not, however,

36

The EUIPO was known as OHIM until March 23, 2016. https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/theoffice.
37
Mahmood, supra at 12, 567.
38
Schickl, supra at 11, 23.
39
Id.
40
Mahmood, supra at 12, 569.
41
Schickl, supra at 11, 25.
42
EUIPO, Annual Report 2015, available at https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnelweb/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/about_euipo/annual_report/annual_report_2015_
en.pdf.
43
CDR, art. 19(1).
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prevent non-profit or experimental use. 44 An unregistered design provides similar but slightly
weaker rights. 45
Community design rights can be challenged, or enforced, through civil actions in either
the EUIPO or national Member courts. 46 Member states, under Article 80 of the CDR, must
designate courts as community design courts to hear cases. Community design courts are
specialized and have jurisdiction only over infringement and invalidity issues. 47 Non-designated
national courts do not have jurisdiction. 48 There is a heavy presumption that approved designs
are valid under the EUIPO’s eligibility requirements, even though designs are not substantively
examined before they are approved. 49 If a court finds infringement of a valid design, it can award
injunctive relief and other appropriate sanctions. 50
To be eligible for community design protection, a design has to be aesthetic, 51 novel, and
have individual character. 52 If a design has functional, and not purely ornamental, features, it can
be a community design only if it was motivated by an aesthetic and not purely functional
purpose. 53 To be novel, there must be “no identical design…made available to the public.” 54 To
have individual character, the design must produce a different “overall impression” than that
“produced on [an informed] user by any design which has been made available to the public.” 55

44

CDR, art. 20(1).
CDR, art. 19(2).
46
CDR, art. 24(1).
47
Philip P. Soo, Enforcing A Unitary Patent in Europe: What the U.S. Federal Courts and Community
Design Courts Teach Us, 35 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 55, 75 (2012).
48
CDR, art. 81.
49
CDR, art. 85.
50
CDR, art. 89.
51
Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 on Community designs, 2002 O.J. L 3, amended by Council
Regulation No. 1891/2006 Hague Agreement amendments, 2006 O.J. L. 386 (hereinafter “CDR”), art. 1.
52
Id at art. 4.
53
Schickl, supra at 11, 24, quoting OHIM, Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of 22 October 2009 in
Case R, 690/2007-3, Lindner Recyclingtech GmbH v. Franssons Verkstader.
54
CDR, art. 5.
55
CDR, art. 6.
45
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National Community Designs
The E.U. permits Member states to maintain national design protections separate from the
E.U. community design regime. Despite the technical individuality of national design standards,
E.U. Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on
the legal protection of designs (DD) did require Member states to harmonize substantive design
protection laws. The main reason why a designer could prefer national protection over E.U.
protection is that national protection has somewhat lower filing fees. 56 The protection is only
enforceable within the jurisdiction of that country, however, and not throughout the E.U. Since
the establishment of community designs, national design applications have unsurprisingly fallen
precipitously. 57 The E.U., after concluding a thorough study of the national and international
design regimes, recommended maintaining the parallel systems to allow diversity of choice, but
also recommended further synchronization among national design regimes. 58
For example, the Netherlands maintains the Benelux design protection regime that it
developed with Belgium and Luxembourg. 59 It has very similar eligibility requirements to the
E.U.’s, and like the EUIPO, the national administrative agency—the Benelux Office for
Intellectual Property—does not examine applications for substantive compliance. 60 Its
substantive laws, while mostly harmonized with the E.U.’s policies, diverge on borderline issues
from other design regimes as a result of slightly different statutory wording or similar, but not

56

Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European Commission,
48 (European Union, 2016).
57
Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European Commission,
32, 34 (European Union, 2016).
58
Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European Commission,
53 (European Union, 2016).
59
Thomas Margoni, Not for Designers: On the Inadequacies of E.U. Design Law and How to Fix It 235
(2013), available at https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/JIPITEC_2013_3.pdf.
60
Peter van der Wees, World Trademark Review, available at
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Intelligence/Design-Rights/2017/Country-chapters/Benelux.
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identical, judicial interpretations. For example, it is standard in Europe that a component of a
complex product is only eligible for protection if it is visible during “normal use.” 61 The Benelux
Office for Intellectual Property explicitly states that “normal use is understood as being the
intended use of the complex product, and being visible during repair is not sufficient to satisfy
the visibility criterion.” 62 Yet Danish case law established that blades of a kitchen utensil were
sufficiently visible even though they were only visible when the utensil was disassembled for
cleaning. 63 The E.U. has offered strong recommendations to resolve these inconsistencies and
has advised ongoing amendments to the governing directives. 64 Still, Member states have
technical independence over ownership, registration, procedures, and remedies associated with
national design protection. 65
B. Comparing E.U. and U.S. Design Law
The community design system is not a perfect parallel to the U.S. design patent system.
In some ways, it is a mix between U.S. patent and copyright protections. 66 The U.S., however,
treats designs as just another category of patent protection, applying most of the same rigorous
standards. The different perspective is underscored by the European Patent Office’s attitude
towards design protection. The agency, which processes all technological IP in the E.U., does not
handle any community design administration, 67 whereas U.S. design patents are handled through
the same USPTO channels as utility patents.

61

CDR, art. 4(2).
Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European Commission,
73 (European Union, 2016).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 12.
65
Id. at 26.
66
Janice M. Mueller and Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the "Impossible Issue" of Nonobviousness in
Design Patents, 99 Ky. L.J. 419, n 580 (2011).
67
When I asked Gino Herreman, the Director of the EPO at The Hague, about design patents, he laughed
and told me that the EPO did not even touch designs.
62
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There are certainly similarities between the U.S. and E.U. design standards, but the U.S.
has significantly narrower eligibility standards for designs than the E.U. The U.S. permits only
ornamental designs, whereas the E.U. allows comprehensive products like fashion, packaging,
and logos. 68 The E.U. is also more forgiving about covering functional elements, whereas the
U.S. strictly limits functional aspects to utility patents. 69 Both systems require that the design be
novel (U.S.) or new (E.U.), although the latter is a much broader standard. 70 There is also
similarity between the nonobvious (U.S.) and “individual character” (E.U) standards. Again, the
E.U. standard is much broader than the U.S. standard. 71 First, the E.U. looks at the “overall
impression” made on an informed user, which emphasizes the holistic image and does not focus
on particular features of the design. 72 Second, it looks from the perspective of an informed user,
which the EUIPO cases have found to be hypothetical users who are reasonably familiar with the
relevant market. 73 The U.S. looks from the perspective of a hypothetical inventor, or a person
having ordinary skill in the art. 74 In sum, not all designs eligible for community design
protection would be eligible for patent protection.
While it is easier to get an E.U. community design than a design patent, the right
conferred is significantly weaker than the U.S. right. 75 United States patent protection is one of
the strongest intellectual property protections in the world. 76 It permits extravagant damages

68

Schickl, supra at 11, 29.
Schickl, supra at 11, 31.
70
Mahmood, supra at 12, 576.
71
See Janice M. Mueller and Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the "Impossible Issue" of Nonobviousness
in Design Patents, 99 Ky. L.J. 419, 535–36 (2011).
72
Id. at 536. See also Maggie Diamond, A Defense of Industrial Design Rights in the United States, 5
NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 1, 35 (2015) (calling it an “easily achievable innovation standard”).
73
Mueller and Brean, supra at 70, 536–37.
74
Schickl, supra at 11, 29.
75
Diamond, supra at 72, 30.
76
Monseau, supra at 21, 529.
69
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based on the infringer’s profits that are unparalleled in other systems. 77 Because of the narrow
boundaries of eligibility and the USPTO’s rigorous enforcement, however, a U.S. patent is
relatively much costlier to obtain than a community design. It is, of course, also costlier for the
United States to process design applications because of the USPTO’s substantive review. The
E.U.’s rubber stamp, meanwhile, does not rack up too many administrative costs.
C. The Hague Agreement
As of 2013, the United States joined the 1999 Hague System for the International
Registration of Industrial Designs (Hague System). 78 There are currently sixty-six Contracting
states worldwide, including all 28 Member states of the EU. 79 The Hague System centralizes
design applications through the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 80 Whereas
before applicants had to apply for design protection in each of the states from which it sought
protection, applicants can now file one Hague System application, in one language, and simply
designate the countries in which they would like design protection. 81 Importantly, it centralizes
only the registration procedure—it does not confer any substantive rights. 82 Therefore,
applications that designate the United States are processed by the USPTO as design patent
applications. 83 Equally crucially, it does not attempt to harmonize any of the national laws. 84
Applicants from Contracting states can file either directly with the WIPO or indirectly through
77

Emmanuel Filandrianos, Designing A Stronger International Portfolio: The Hague Agreement and U.S.
Industrial Design Remedies, 22 Westlaw Journal Intellectual Property 1, 3 (2015). See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 289. But see Samsung Elec. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S.Ct. 429 (2016) (overturning a $1 billion award and
holding that total profits may be measured relative to the infringing component and not the entire end
product).
78
Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 107, 155 (2016).
79
WIPO-Administered Treaties, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=9.
80
Mahmood, supra at 12, 569–70.
81
Diamond, supra at 72, 38.
82
Monseau, supra at 21, 520.
83
35 U.S.C. § 385.
84
Id.
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their national offices. 85 Applicants can then designate the countries from which they seek
national registration. Each country is required to produce a decision on the application within
one year. 86 National offices cannot reject an application for procedural violations of their own
laws if the application complies with the form of the Hague System’s international application.
Therefore, an applicant should receive an approval within twelve months from the nations which
he designated in its international application, unless his design is ineligible under national
substantive laws.
III. THE HAGUE SYSTEM IN THE E.U. AND THE U.S.
A. The Hague Agreement and the E.U.: Complementary Frameworks
The Hague Agreement fits into Europe’s general scheme of harmonious international IP
rights, as well as its deliberate protections for designs. Within Europe, for example, the E.U. is
close to developing a unitary patent that will standardize substantive utility patent law. 87 Outside
of Europe, the E.U.—as well as the U.S.—has joined international systems like the Madrid
Protocol for international trademark protection. 88 The Hague Agreement also complements the
E.U.’s design protection regime. When the E.U. overhauled its design protections, it considered
the Hague System and intentionally adopted accommodating features. 89 As a practical matter, the
Hague Agreement does not inflict any significant costs on the EUIPO. While the agency must
process more applications, the costs are nominal because there is no substantive examination.

85

Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, July 2, 1999, 2279
U.N.T.S 156 (“Hague Agreement”), art. 4.
86
Common Regulations Under the 1999 Act and the 1960 Act of the Hague Agreement, Rule 18:
Notification of Refusal, WIPO.
87
See generally Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An
Analysis of Europe's Long Standing Attempt to Create A Supranational Patent System, 94 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc'y 162 (2012).
88
See WIPO, Treaty Membership, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=EU#a6.
89
Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European Commission,
39 (European Union, 2016).
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There are no publicly available analyses of whether the Hague System has significantly
increased the overall number of community design applications, although it would be consistent
with the purpose of the scheme and the increased efficiency of the system. The number of design
filings by Europeans within Europe has remained stable since the E.U. joined the Hague
Agreement in 2008. 90 During that time, however, there have been more E.U. applications from
non-Europeans. 91 This cannot be credited entirely to the Hague System: a significant portion of
that increase is due to applicants from China, which is not a contracting state. Still, WIPO has
reported a significant increase in Hague System filings. 92 The number of applications jumped
from 2,220 in 2010 to 5,230 in 2016. 93
Although these statistics do not prove that the Hague System is the cause of the increase,
they do demonstrate that the international filing system is at least providing the initial step for
protection in many cases. The efficiency of the Hague System is probably causing more nonEuropeans to file in Europe. Yet there do not seem to be many associated costs with the
increased number of designs, while the number of E.U. designers who benefit from seeking
international design protection through the system is quite substantial. 94 There is no official data
about the rates at which the increasing number of designs have increased, or are projected to

90

Id. at 51.
Id. at 54.
92
WIPO, U.S. Extends Lead in International Patent and Trademark Filings (March 16, 2016), at
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2016/article_0002.html.
93
WIPO, Statistics Under the Hague System, at
http://www.wipo.int/hague/en/statistics/annual_stats.jsp?type=EN&type2=reg&Tname=REP8&name=by
CP.
94 WIPO, Statistics Under the Hague System, at
http://www.wipo.int/hague/en/statistics/annual_stats.jsp?type=EN&type2=reg&Tname=REP8&name=by
CP.
91
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increase, litigation in Europe. 95 The silence suggests that neither the EUIPO or the associated
courts have been burdened by the increased number of design applications.
Ultimately, the data suggest that applicants prefer the Hague System to EU or national
design protections. 96 Once countries outside the E.U. acceded to the Hague Agreement,
designers from those countries were probably more likely to file through the Hague System
instead of the community design system. 97 It is simply less expensive to add an E.U. designation
through the Hague System than to apply separately for a community design. The more countries
accede, the more efficient the Hague System becomes. This efficiency likely encouraged the
entry of recent Contracting states, like Japan and the U.S. 98
B. The United States and the Hague System: Forcing a Fit
The Hague System may increase the pressure on the low-traffic U.S. design system. The
USPTO simply does not receive many design applications relative to utility applications, and—
until the smartphone wars—design litigation has been low stakes. Companies didn’t worry about
seeking or defending design patents because the returns weren’t worth the hassle. Because the
Hague System makes it easier for applicants to designate the U.S. along with countries that are
more traditional targets for design protection, the U.S. will likely see a significant increase in
applications. 99 For example, a designer that applies for protection in the E.U. may as well pay a
little extra and check the U.S. box too. After all, the size of the U.S. market makes it likely that
someone will try to profit from a successful European design. More important, the courts can

95

See Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European
Commission, 28 (European Union, 2016).
96
Legal Review on Industrial Design Protection in Europe, MARKT2014/083/D, European Commission,
38 (European Union, 2016).
97
Id. at 42.
98
Id. at 42–43.
99
See Burstein, supra at 78, at 155.
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allow high damages for infringement. 100 It is true that the applicant will have to face the more
stringent substantive requirements; applicants may soon learn that the Hague System doesn’t
make a fainthearted designation worthwhile. Until then, however, the USPTO may have to
wrestle with increased demand.
While it is too early to make long-term predictions, short-term results suggest that the
Hague Agreement has made the USPTO a popular design destination. The latest data on design
patent applications submitted to the USPTO are from 2015, the year in which the Hague
Agreement took effect in the U.S.—the agency has yet to post information about the number of
applications filed through the Hague System. 101 WIPO’s data suggests that designers are using
the Hague System to apply to the U.S., although it is difficult to determine whether they would
have otherwise separately applied. WIPO reports a total of 528 international registrations by the
United States from January through March 2017, and a total of 2,076 in 2016. 102
Joining the Hague Agreement did not require the U.S. to change its substantive law, but
its procedural requirements may pressure the USPTO to reevaluate its embalmed design patent
framework. The U.S. had to compromise on a few procedural issues, but they were fairly
insignificant. For example, the USPTO must now accept color photographs of designs, even
though it had previously only accepted black and white figures. 103 Because of the significant
distinctions between the U.S. design patent policies and other countries’, the substantive
disharmony is fairly disruptive to the uniform system conceived by the Hague Agreement. For
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example, the Hague System permits applicants to bundle multiple designs in one application, but
the USPTO can refuse an application for lacking “unity of design,” a substantive—not
procedural—basis of eligibility. 104 Some scholars have suggested that U.S. courts have
responded to international pressures by subtly bringing design patent law into agreement with
international standards, which could increase the relevance of the Hague System’s uniform
application procedure. 105
While increased applications to the United States may show that the Hague Agreement is
a success on international terms, it may severely disrupt the U.S. patent system. The USPTO’s
substantive application examinations distinguishes it from the E.U. system, which relies almost
exclusively on private enforcement. Sure, private enforcement may clog the court system in the
long term, but substantive agency examinations stop up the patent examining process in the short
term. Because the Hague Agreement requires the U.S. to determine refusals within twelve
months, the U.S. will have to compromise its examination standards in order to make the
deadline. Shoddy patents will increase validity challenges within the USPTO and federal courts,
exacerbating administrative costs and undermining public confidence in IP protections. 106
The USPTO may simply be unable to process design applications within the Hague
System’s framework. So far, the USPTO has managed to respond within twelve months, but the
first significant wave of applications is now nearing its deadline. 107 The USPTO is notorious for
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long examination times and inefficient examiners. 108 Patent prosecution is resource intensive,
and the backlog in the agency has been building. 109 Although Hague System applicants pay fees
to designated countries, the fees do not cover the actual costs of the USPTO’s examination. 110
Moreover, diverting its examination resources to international applications will delay those who
are applying for patents only nationally. Design patent applicants are especially vulnerable to
delayed examination periods because designs are typically commercially valuable for only a
short time. 111 Of course, the most obvious solution is for the USPTO to hire more examiners. 112
The agency has increased its hiring efforts. 113 Yet it is debatable whether the money should be
spent on international design applications instead of national utility applications, which have
traditionally been the agency’s primary focus.
It is not clear, therefore, that the U.S. will benefit from the Hague Agreement. The
USPTO will likely have to handle significantly more applications, and it has to exert much more
effort than its European peers because of its idiosyncratic substantive review. The Agreement
may be worthwhile, however, if American designers are benefitting from the streamlined
application process. Because a designer can only apply through the Hague System if he is
associated with a Contracting party, the U.S.’s participation may be significantly helping
American designers get protection internationally. The correct metric for success, therefore, may
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be WIPO’s future reports on international registrations by the Contracting party of the design
holder. 114
Participation in the Hague Agreement may also serve as an important signal to the
international community that the United States is willing to collaborate on intellectual property
policies. The U.S. has recently struggled to enforce its intellectual property rights against foreign
nationals and sovereigns. 115 Joining multinational agreements to enforce intellectual property
rights has been a key strategy to restrict theft beyond U.S. borders. 116 It is also possible that
participation in the Hague System is a precursor to a more thorough overhaul of the U.S. design
patent system. If the U.S. is looking toward harmonization with international intellectual
property rights, design patents stick out as anachronisms. High-profile cases, like the battle
between Samsung and Apple, and categories of innovation that don’t fit traditional utility patent
guidelines 117 may spur substantive change. For now, increased international harmonization
remains, quite literally, on the USPTO’s agenda. 118
CONCLUSION
The United States and the European Union have developed different design protection
regimes. In the U.S., designs have taken a backseat in the IP regime until recently. In the E.U.,
however, design protection has been an important element of the harmonization of IP regimes
114
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across member states. The Hague Agreement, which affects only design protection procedures—
and only minimally—may demonstrate how idiosyncratic the U.S. system truly is. Perhaps the
international pressure will encourage the U.S. to reevaluate design patents, how they work within
the U.S. national IP regime, and whether they should reflect the unification of global IP
standards.

